

## Message Text

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ACTION ARA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 SP-02 PM-03 L-01

INR-05 CIAE-00 PRS-01 EB-03 /041 W

----- 093725

R 191500Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1225

INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

AMEMBASSY LA PAZ

AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

DIA DOD WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 3425

LIMDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PFOR, AR

SUBJECT: REASSESSMENT OF ARGENTINE SITUATION IN VIEW OF LOPEZ

REGA'S RISING STAR

REF: A. A-85 OF APRIL 11, 1975, B. BA 2947, C. BA 2841, D. BA 2163

1. SUMMARY. COMPLEXION OF POLITICAL SCENE HAS CHANGED APPRECIABLY SINCE APRIL 25 FAILURE TO ELECT PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT OF SENATE (SEE REF B). LATTER POINTED UP INABILITY OF CIVILIAN POLITICAL SECTORS TO MOUNT A UNITED AND EFFECTIVE EFFORT TO BLOCK LOPEZ REGA. EMBASSY'S EARLIER ASSESSMENT (SEE REF A) THAT UNLESS MRS. PERON MAKES SIGNIFICANT ADJUSTMENTS IN HER GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES (ESPECIALLY ECONOMIC), SHE UNLIKELY TO LAST OUT 1975 AS PRESIDENT, REMAINS VALID. HOWEVER, CONCLUSION THAT LIKELY SCENARIO FOR TRANSFER OF POWER WAS ONE IN WHICH CIVILIAN POLITICAL SECTORS WITH SUPPORT OF MILITARY MIGHT FORCE OUT LOPEZ REGA, AND POSSIBLY MRS. PERON, AND THEN SUPPORT CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSOR UNTIL ELECTIONS, NO LONGER APPEARS TO BE COGENT. INSTEAD, MOST OBSERVERS NOW

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BELIEVE THAT AN OUTRIGHT MILITARY TAKEOVER HAS BECOME

LIKELY. THE ARMED FORCES DO NOT WANT TO TAKE POWER, HOWEVER, AND PROBABLY WILL NOT DO SO UNTIL CONVINCED THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE--I.E. UNTIL THE SITUATION IS MUCH WORSE THAN IT IS NOW. MEANWHILE, LOPEZ REGA WILL TRY TO NEUTRALIZE THE MILITARY THREAT. HIS DEFENESTRATION OF GENERAL ANAYA WAS DOUBTLESS THE OPENING MOVE IN THIS EFFORT. THE ALTERNATIVES, THEN, SEEM TO COME DOWN TO THE ARMY OR LOPEZ REGA. NEITHER IS VERY PALATABLE, BUT THE COUNTRY PROBABLY HAS A BETTER CHANCE WITH THE FORMER THAN WITH THE LATTER. LOGIVALLY THE BETS MUST BE ON THE ARMY TO WIN IN ITS POWER STRUGGLE WITH LOPEZ REGA, ALTHOUGH HE HAS COME MUCH FURTHER THAN MOST OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE PREDICTED AND CANNOT BE COUNTED OUT. EITHER WAY, ARGENTINA FACES PERHAPS THE DARKEST PERIOD IN HER MODERN HISTORY--I.E. SINCE 1880. END SUMMARY.

2. LABOR. UNTIL APRIL 25, FORCES OPPOSING LOPEZ REGA HAD FELT SOME CONFIDENCE THAT THEY COULD ACT TOGETHER AND GET RID OF HIM, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PRESERVING CONSTITUTIONALISM. AS ENVISAGED BY MOST, THIS WOULD BE DONE THROUGH A DEMARCHE ON THE PART OF THE LABOR UNIONS, PERONIST POLITICIANS AND RADICALES, SUPPORTED BY THE MILITARY. THE DEMARCHE MIGHT HAVE BEEN JOINT, OR ONE SPEARHEADED BY ONE SECTOR AND SIMPLY BACKED BY THE OTHERS. LABOR'S MOVE IN LATE MARCH AND EARLY APRIL APPEARED TO BE THE BEGINNING OF SUCH A DEMARCHE (SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, BA-2163). LABOR LEADERS DID PRESENT CERTAIN DEMANDS TO MRS. PERON, AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT SHE SHOULD GET RID OF LOPEZ REGA. THE LATTER, HOWEVER, SO STRUCTURED MRS. PERON'S MEETINGS WITH THE LABOR LEADERS THAT IT WAS AWKWARD FOR THEM TO PRESS THEIR DEMANDS. MOREOVER, THE LABOR LEADERS THEMSELVES DID NOT PURSUE THEIR CASE AGAINST LOPEZ REGA AS VIGOROUSLY AS THEY MIGHT HAVE--PROBABLY BECAUSE THEY FEARED THAT IF THEY PLACED THEMSELVES IN A POSITION OF OUTRIGHT OPPOSITION TO MRS. PERON, THE BASES MIGHT TURN AGAINST THEM. AT ANY RATE, WITH THEIR APRIL 22 MEETING WITH HER (SEE BA 2841), THEIR MOVE AGAINST LOPEZ REGA DWINDLED. LABOR CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR GREATER PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT AND FOR A LARGER SLICE OF THE PIE GENERALLY. HOWEVER, WHILE THIS MAY LEAVE THEM IN A DE FACTO ADVERSARY

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RELATIONSHIP WITH LOPEZ REGA, WHO DOES NOT WANT TO SHARE ANY MORE POWER THAN HE HAS TO, THE LABOR LEADERS APPEAR TO HAVE DECIDED TO PUBLICLY BURY THE HATCHET WITH HIM AND BIDE THEIR TIME. THE MAY 12 EDITION OF SEMANA POLITICA (CONTROLLED BY LORENZO MIGUEL), FOR EXAMPLE, CARRIES A FULL-PAGE PICTURE OF LOPEZ REGA OVER AN EXCEEDINGLY LAUDATORY CAPTION. AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT, LABOR'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE COURT FAVORITE HAS OBVIOUSLY COLLAPSED.

3. PERONIST POLITICIANS. ANY LIKELIHOOD THAT THE PERONIST POLITICIANS WOULD MAKE A STAND AGAINST LOPEZ REGA ALSO APPEARS TO HAVE COLLAPSED WITH THEIR FAILURE ON APRIL 25 TO INSIST ON THE ELECTION OF A PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT (PRESIDENT PRO TEM) OF THE SENATE. THE MANEUVER TO LEAVE THE POSITION OPEN WAS CLEARLY ENGINEERED BY LOPEZ REGA WITH THE AIM OF ACQUIRING MORE POWER FOR MRSM PERON-- AND FOR HIMSELF--AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CONGRESS (AND OF THE CONSTITUTION). THE DAY BEFORE, MANY OF THE FREJULI SENATORS WERE SWEARING THEY WOULD STAND FIRM. BY THE TIME THE VOTE WAS TAKEN, HOWEVER, THE FIGHT HAD GONE OUT OF THEM. ALL FREJULI SENATORS EITHER MEEKLY VOTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MRS. PERON'S DEMANDS OR FAILED TO SHOW UP FOR THE VOTE COUNT. AS ONE PERONIST POLITICIAN PUT IT TO AN EMBOFF: "WE HAVE DELUDED OURSELVES. WE HAD BELIEVED THAT WHEN THE TIME CAME, WE COULD FACE UP TO LOPEZ REGA, EVEN IF IT MEANT GOING AGAINST MRS. PERON. ON APRIL 25, THE TIME CAME AND WE FAILED. WE HAVE BEEN PERONISTS TOO LONG. WE CANNOT GO AGAINST THE LEAD OF THE PARTY--ESPECIALLY PERON'S WIDOW--EVEN IF WE KNOW SHE IS LEADING THE PARTY TO RUIN."

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----- 093837

R 191447Z MAY 75

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 3425

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4. THE UCR. THE OPPOSITION PARTIES HAVE DRAWN THEIR OWN CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FACT THAT THEIR PERONIST COLLEAGUES CAVED IN TO MRS. PERON ON APRIL 25. PERONISTS, AS WELL AS RADICALES AND OTHER OPPOSITION POLITICIANS, HAVE LONG SAID THAT ANY SUCCESSFUL MOVE TO OUST LOPEZ REGA WITHOUT RESORT TO FORCE OF ARMS WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM WITHIN PERONISMO. AFTER WHAT HAPPENED ON APRIL 25, NO ONE BELIEVES THAT MOVE WILL COME. THE UCR, DISAPPOINTED WITH THE DIRECTION EVENTS HAVE TAKEN, BUT UNABLE TO DO MORE THAN PROTEST, HAS GONE OVER TO A MORE PRONOUNCED FORM OF OPPOSITION TO THE GOA AND ITS POLICIES. THEIR POSITION, HOWEVER, IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. IF THEY DO NOT PROTEST SUFFICIENTLY, THEY WILL BE CHARGED WITH BEING ACCOMPLICES TO LOPEZ REGA'S MACHINATIONS. IF THEY PROTEST TOO MUCH, THEY WILL BE CHARGED WITH ATTEMPTING TO PROVOKE A GOLPE. ONE TOP RANKING UCR PPLITICIAN DESCRIBED THEIR DILEMMA IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS: "WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROTEST THE GOVERNMENTS SLIDE TOWARDS A FORM OF FASCISM. BUT WE CANNOT STOP IT. WE HAVE NEITHER GUNS NOR ENOUGH VOTES. THE MILITARY HAVE THE GUNS. ONLY THEY NOW STAND IN LOPEZ SECRET

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REGA'S WAY."

5. THE ARMED FORCES. THE MILITARY, HOWEVER, HAVING BEEN BADLY BURNED DURING THE 1966-73 PERIOD, DO NOT WANT TO TAKE POWER AGAIN. THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN DELIGHTED HAD LABOR, OR THE OTHER POLITICAL SECTORS, BEEN ABLE TO GET RID OF LOPEZ REGA. BUT THEY THEMSELVES DID NOT OPENLY JOIN IN THE EFFORT--THOUGH THEY WEREIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE LABOR LEADERS. NONETHELESS, THE MILITARY ARE GRADUALLY COMING AROUND TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SOONER OR LATER THEY WILL HAVE TO TAKE OVER AGAIN. THEY ARE LIKELY TO DO SO ONLY AS A LAST RESORT--I.E. WHEN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHAOS SEEM IMMINENT OR WHEN THE ARMY AS AN INSTITUTION IS THREATENED--BUT AT THE PRESENT RATE OF DETERIORATION, THAT POINT WILL PROBABLY BE REACHED BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR.

6. LOPEZ REGA, OF COURSE, IS WELL AWARE OF THE LOOMING THREAT FROM THE MILITARY SECTOR AND IS MOVING TO NEUTRALIZE IT. REPLACING GENERAL ANAYA WITH GENERAL LAPLANE AS COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE ARMY WAS DOUBTLESS THE OPENING MOVE IN HIS CAMPAIGN (SEE SEPTEL). IF HE IS TO GET RID OF ALL THOSE WHO OPPOSE HIM, HOWEVER, HE WILL HAVE TO DECIMATE THE OFFICERS CORPS. THIS WILL BE SEEN BY THE LATTER AS A THREAT TO THE ARMY AS AN INSTITUTIO, AND THAT KIND OF THREAT, HISTORICALLY, HAS BEEN THE ONE THING CERTAIN TO BRING ABOUT MILITARY INTERVENTION. WHETHER OR NOT HISTORY WILL REPEAT ITSELF REMAINS TO BE SEEN. IT SEEMS MOST UNLIKELY

THAT THE ARMY WILL SIMPLY STAND BY WHILE LOPEZ REGA HACKS AWAY AT IT WITH AN AXE. ON THE OTHER HAND, LOPEZ REGA HAS DISPLAYED A GREAT CAPACITY FOR OUTMANEUVERING HIS OPPONENTS. EVEN IN A CONFLICT WITH THE ARMY, ONE CANNOT WRITE HIM OFF.

7. AS THE DRIVE ON THE PART OF THE ANTI-LOPEZ REGA FORCES HAS FALTERED, MRS. PERON AND LOPEZ REGA HAVE GONE OVER TO THE ATTACK. A FEW WEEKS AGO, LOPEZ REGA WAS BEHAVING VERY DEFENSIVELY. TODAY, HE WALKS LIKE SOMEONE WHO KNOWS HE HAS WON THE GAME. IN APRIL, IT WAS OTERO, VIGNES AND IVANISSEVICH (THE MINISTERS WHO GO ALONG WITH LOPEZ REGA) WHO APPEARED TO BE IN DANGER. NOW IT IS ROCAMORA AND GOMEZ MORALES, HIS OPPONENTS, WHO ARE IN MORE TROUBLE (SAVINO IS IN A CATEGORY APART--SEE BA 3324). MRS. PERON  
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HAS ALSO CHANGED HER LINE. PRIOR TO HER MAY 1 STATE OF THE NATION SPEECH, MRS. PERON HAD OFTEN TEMPORIZED ON THE QUESTION OF LOPEZ REGA'S ROLE, SOMETIMES APPEARING TO BE APOLOGETIC AND LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT SHE COULD BE LEVERED AWAY FROM HER PRIVAT SECRETARY. WHETHER THIS WAS ONLY AN ACT, OR WEHTHER SHE IN FACT HAD DOUBTS ABOUT LOPEZ REGA IS IMMATERIAL. AT THIS POINT, THERE IS NO LONGER ANY QUESTION AS TO WHERE SHE STANDS. NEITHER PERONIST ONOR UCR POLITICIANS MISSED THE IMPLICATIONS OF A PRAGRAPH IN HER STATE OF THE NATION SPEECH IN WHICH SHE IN EFFECT SAID THAT PERONISMO IS SOCIAL WELFARE, AND SOCIAL WELFARE IS LOPEX REGA. ERGO, LOPEZ REGA IS PERONISMO. FOR SOMEONE WHO REMAINED IN THE FEDERAL POLICE FROM 1955 TO 1962, WHEN REAL PERONISTS WERE IN PRISON, HE HAS COME A LONG WAY.

9. LOPEZ REGA, WHO IS NOW CLEARLY THE POWER BEHIND THE THRONE AND THE MAN WHO IS REUNNING THE GOVERNMENTS SHOW, HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT HE IS AN EXTREMELY ADEPT AND WILY INFIGHTER. UNFORTUNATELY FOR THE COUNTRY, NEITHER HE NOR MRS. PERON HAVE GIVEN ANY EVIDENCE THAT THIS GIFT FOR POLITICAL MANEUVER IS COMBINED WITH ADMINISTRATIVE ABILITY. THEY HAVE FACED DOWN THEIR CIVILIAN OPPONENTS, BUT THEY ARE FAILING MISERABLY AT RUNNING THE COUNTRY. VIOLENCE CONTINUE TO RISE, THE ECONOMY IS SINKING RAPIDLY, CORRUPTION IS BECOMING RAMPANT, THE POLITICAL CONSENSUS HAS BEEN SHREDDED AND OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE ASSUMING THE POSTURE OF ADVERSARIES. THESE PROBLEMS ARE NOT PARAMOUNT IN LOPEZ REGAS MIND. HIS ATTENTION IS FIXED UPON IMPOSING HIS WILL ON ARGENTINA. HE MEANS TO MAKE HIMSELF ARGENTINAS UNCHALLENGED STRONGMAN--WHETHER FROM BEHIND THE THRONE, OR, AS HE PROBABLY HOPES, EVENTUALLY AS CHIEF OF STATE (THOUGH HE COULD NOT WIN AN HONEST ELECTION).

10. CONCLUSIONS. THE CONCLUSION ONE CAN DRAW FROM ALL THIS ARE THE FOLLOWING: A) AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, LOPEZ REGA HAS OUTMANEUVERED AND DEFEATED HIS CIVILIAN OPPONENTS; B) THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THOSE OPPONENTS CAN REGROUP: HENCE THE HOPE THAT LOPEZ REGA COULD BE FORCED OUT BY POLITICAL MENS (AS OPPOSED TO MILITARY) NOW SEEMS FORLORN; C) MRS. PERON WILL NOT  
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ABANDON LOPEZ REGA; D) MRS. PERON AND LOPEZ REGA WILL CONTINUE TO LEAD THE COUNTRY ALONG A COURSE HEADED FOR MORE ECONOMIC TROUBLE AND THE TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF ANY POLITICAL CONSENSUS; E) IN TIME, PROBABLY BEFORE THE END OF 1975, THE SITUATION WIL BECOME SO BAD, BOTH POLITICALLY AND EXONOMICALLY, THAT THE MILITARY WILL HAVE LITTEL ALTERNATIVE BUT TO AGAIN TAKE POWER--OR, AT LEAST, TO TRY TO; F) LOPEZ REGA, HOWEVE, WILL MEANWHILE TRY TO INFILTRATE THE ARMY AND KEEP IT OFF BALANCE TO THT THE GOLPE, WHEN IT COMES, WILL FAIL; G) EVEN IF THE GOLPE SUCCEEDS, IT WIL HARDLY PROVE A PANACEA FOR THE COUNTRYS ILLS. THAT ROUTE HAS BEEN TRIED TOO MANY TIMES BEFORE. IT MIGHT HOWEVER PROVE THE LEAST OF THE POSSIBLE ILLS. MUCH WOULD DEPEND UPON WHAT THE XVMMV# MILITARY DID WITH IT AFTER TAKING POWER. ONE SOLUTION, FOR EXAMPLE MIGHT BE TO CALL IMMEDIATELY FOR ELECTIONS BEFORE 1977 WHILE IN THE INTERIM TURNING THE ACTUAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY OVER TO A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT COMPOSED OF COMPETENT MEN. THAT, HOWEVER, IS ALMOST TOO MUCH TO HOPE FOR.

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INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 SP-02 PM-03 L-01

INR-05 CIAE-00 PRS-01 EB-03 /041 W

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R 191447Z MAY 75  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1227  
INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION  
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO  
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IMPLICATIONS FOR ARGENTINA.

11. THE CENTRAL QUESTION HAS BECOME: WILL LOPEZ REGA CONSOLIDATE HIS POWER, OR WILL THE ARMY THROW HIM OUT (BEFORE IT ITSELF IS GUTTED)? LOGICALLY, ONE WOULD HAVE TO BET ON THE ARMY...BUT LOPEZ REGA CANNOT BE COUNTED OUT. IF LOPEZ REGA WINS, ARGENTINA MAY WELL BE LED TO ECONOMIC BANKRUPTCY AND POLITICAL CHAOS. A GOLPE MIGHT NOT SOLVE THINGS EITHER. IN SUM, THEN, ARGENTINA HAS REACHED SUCH AN IMPASSE THAT THERE ARE NO OBVIOUS AND HAPPY SOLUTIONS AVAILABLE--ALTHOUGH THE COUNTRY PROBABLY HAS A BETTER CHANCE WITH THE ARMY THAN WITH LOPEZ REGA. IN TIME A SOLUTION MAY APPEAR, AS IT HAS FREQUENTLY BEFORE, BUT BEFORE IT DOES, ARGENTINA IS LIKELY TO PASS THROUGH A TIME OF TROUBLE UNEQUALED IN ITS HISTORY AS A MODERN NATION STATE.

12. IMPLICATIONS FOR US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS. WHILE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ARGENTINA OF THE RISE OF LOPEZ REGA ARE PROFOUND AND DISTURBING, THAT ASCENDANCY IS NOT LIKELY TO HAVE MAJOR IMMEDIATE IMPACT ON US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS.

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LOPEZ REGA AND MRS. PERON WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO LEAVE FOREIGN POLICY PRETTY MUCH IN THE HANDS OF FONMIGNES AND HIS PROFESSIONAL STAFF--THOUGH AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE LOPEZ REGA MAY CONTINUE TO DABBLE IN RELATIONS WITH LIBYA AND A FEW OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. FURTHER, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, LOPEZ REGA WILL PROBABLY BE CONTENT TO REMAIN THE POWER BEHIND THE THRONE. HENCE, WE WILL NOT BE PLACED, OR OFTEN BE PLACED, IN THE POSITION OF DEALING DIRECTLY WITH HIM; RATHER, WE CAN CONTINUE TO WORK THROUGH THE CORRECT AND NORMAL CHANNELS--I.E. MRS. PERON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. LOPEZ REGA IS FULLY AWARE THAT THE US IS AND WILL BE ARGENTINA'S BEST SOURCE OF CREDIT, WHICH THE

COUNTRY BADLY NEEDS. AND WHILE HE LEANS MOST TOWARDS THE RIGHTIST-NATIONALIST PERONIST TENDECNY, AND IS NO PARTICULAR FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES, NEITHER HAS HE DISPLAYED ANY OUTRIGHT HOSTILITY. ON THE CONTRARY, ON OCCASIONS WHEN HAS HAS MET AMBASSADOR HILL AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY STAFF, HE HAS BEEN MOST CORDIAL. HIS STANCE VIS-A-VIS THE US WILL DOUBTLESS BE DICTATED BY CONSIDERATIONS OF WHAT HE CAN GAIN. CHANCES ARE, THEN, THAT HE WILL WISH TO MAINTAIN REASONABLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH US, AND SHAKE US DOWN WHEN HE CAN. ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOULD THE ECONOMIC SITUATION DETERIORATE MUCH FURTHER, CAUSING SOCIAL TURMOIL, LOPEZ REGA MIGHT WELL SEE "YANKEE IMPERIALISM" AS A CONVENIENT SCAPEGOAT AND BEGIN TO BEAT THE DRUM AGAINST THE MONOPOLIES. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, CHANCES OF RESOLVING SATISFACTORILY ANY OF OUR SEVERAL INVESTMENT PROBLEMS WOULD BE GREATLY DIMINISHED.

13. THE US RESPONSE. THE US POSTURE IN VIEW OF LOPEZ REGAS ASCENDANCY WILL BE TREATED IN GREATER DEPTH IN THE REVISED CASP. SUFFICE IT HERE TO SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING: LOPEZ REGA AND MRS. PERON WILL PROBABLY BE OUSTED BY THE ARMY BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR, BUT THERE IS A CHANCE THAT LOPEZ REGA WILL OUTMANEUVER THE OFFICERS AND COME OUT ON TOP. (AND GIVEN THAT HE IS SUCH A CONTROVERSIAL CHARACTER WITH SO MANY ENEMIES, THERE IS INCREASING SPECULATION ON THE CHANCES OF HIS BEING ASSASSINATED.) HENCE, WHILE WE CERTAINLY SHOULD NOT RUSH TO EMBRACE HIM, SINCE  
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THAT COULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE OUR POSITION WITH ANY FUTURE GOVERNMENT (AND, INDEED, GIVEN THAT HE IS SUCH A CONTROVERSIAL FIGURE, WITH THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE ARGENTINE PUBLIC), NEITHER SHOULD WE BURN ANY BRIDGES BY TAKING A STANCE AGAINST HIM. ANYWAY, THIS IS AN INTERNAL STRUGGLE IN WHICH WE DO NOT WISH TO INVOLVE OURSELVES; HENCE, OUR POSITION SHOULD BE ONE OF NEUTRALITY AND OF DEALING CORRECTLY AND NORMALLY THROUGH THE PROPER CHANNELS. INSTANCES ARE NOW ARISING IN WHICH WE MAY HAVE TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH LOPEZ REGA, BUT WE SHOULD KEEP DIRECT CONTACT WITH HIM TO A MINIMUM. WHEN WE MUST DEAL WITH HIM, WE SHOULD DO SO ON THE BASIS OF STRICT PRAGMATISM, WITH NO ILLUSIONS AS TO THE KIND OF MAN WE ARE DEALING WITH.  
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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** ARMED FORCES, POLITICAL SITUATION, POLITICAL PARTIES, FORM OF GOVERNMENT, POLITICAL SUMMARIES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 19 MAY 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** CunninFX  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975BUENOS03425  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750175-0850  
**From:** BUENOS AIRES  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
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**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750537/aaaabgxh.tel  
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**Office:** ACTION ARA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 8  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 75 A-85, 75 OF APRIL 11, 75 1975, 75 BA 2947, 75 BA 2841, 75 BA 2163  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** CunninFX  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 03 SEP 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <03 SEP 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <18 DEC 2003 by CunninFX>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** REASSESSMENT OF ARGENTINE SITUATION IN VIEW OF LOPEZ REGA'S RISING STAR  
**TAGS:** PINT, PFOR, AR, (LOPEZ REGA, JOSE)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006